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I
n this article
1 I reflect on the recurrent theme of
modernizing historical mathematical proofs, vocabulary,
and symbolism, and the extent to which this modern-
ization serves to clarify, is able to preserve, or is bound to
distort the original meaning. My example is also a
recurrent one: Euclid’s proof of the infinitude of primes
in book IX, theorem 20 of his Elements. Elementary
number theory is a very appropriate field for discussing
such general historiographic questions on a nontechnical
level.2 Indeed, a widely quoted and stimulating article by
Michael Hardy and Catherine Woodgold (henceforth
H&W) entitled ‘‘Prime Simplicity’’ appeared in this journal
in 2009. H&W discuss Euclid’s proof mainly from the
point of view of its distortion by modern authors who
quite often claim that it had the form of a reductio ad
absurdum.3
My article, on the other hand, aims at a systematic pre-
sentation and logical analysis of Euclid’s proof (as it is
preserved in the critical editions by Euclid scholars) and,
above all, at a more detailed discussion of its interpretation
1I dedicate this article to Walter Purkert (Bonn), the coordinator and very active force behind the excellent Felix Hausdorff edition soon to be completed, on the occasion
of his 70th birthday in 2014.
2Mesˇtrovic´ (2012) contains many details on modern proofs of the infinitude of primes but is less interested in Euclid’s original theorem and its modern variants. Most of
his material goes far beyond the simple fact of the infinitude of primes that is the focus of the present paper.
3In the following, the notions reductio ad absurdum, proof by contradiction, and indirect proof are used interchangeably for assuming the logical opposite of what one
wants to prove and then reaching, by legitimate logical steps, a contradiction that requires the assumption of the original claim.
 2014 Springer Science+Business Media New York, Volume 36, Number 4, 2014 87
DOI 10.1007/s00283-014-9506-9
and rewriting by a few select modern mathematicians,
foremost among them Dirichlet, G. H. Hardy, and Hilbert.4
As I will show, Euclid’s proof was constructive. For all
the emphasis put on properties and axiomatic structure as
displayed in Euclid’s Elements, constructions—finding, in
finitely many legitimate steps (i.e., those allowed by axioms
and theorems), a mathematical object with certain prop-
erties—is the backbone of Greek mathematics.5 More
specifically, I will argue that Euclid’s proof is ‘‘weakly
constructive,’’ and it is partly this weak form of construc-
tiveness—the fact that Euclid does not provide an effective
method (formula) to calculate new primes from given
ones—which provided modern mathematicians with the
wrong impression that Euclid’s proof was indirect.
I agree with H&W that the insinuation of an indirect proof
in Euclid IX, 20 became the ‘‘prevailing doctrine’’ when
modern mathematicians wanted to relate in a positive way to
Euclid’s geometry. However, modern presentations of
Euclid’s proof, such as the ones by Hardy in 1938 and 1940,
are not genuine indirect proofs of the infinitude of primes.
They are quite close in spirit and content to Euclid’s original
proof.
What Does ‘‘Projecting Modern Mathematics
into the Past’’ Mean, and How Much Historical
Accuracy Can or Should One Reach in Modern
Texts?
Mathematicians and historians projecting modern mathe-
matics into the past can miss essential points of the
intentions and results of the historical creators of mathe-
matics. To mention a few: the modern notion of functional
dependence and its graphic representation originated
(basically) in the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century,
connected to the need to extend the realm of mathematical
objects to some ‘‘mechanical’’ curves (higher algebraic
curves treated by Descartes) and to formulate the laws of
physics (Newton). Projecting that modern notion uncriti-
cally into the past does not, however, help us much to
understand Apollonius’s sophisticated theory of conics.
Even Euclid’s Elements, which, because of their axiomatic
structure, have a more familiar appeal to modern mathe-
maticians than Apollonius’s works, cause heated
methodological-historical debates in their modern inter-
pretations. For example, the deep theory of geometric
proportions in book V of the Elements caused R. Lipschitz,
in his discussion with R. Dedekind in the 1870s, to claim its
logical equivalence with the modern definition of real
numbers. The latter, being the inventor of the Dedekind
cut, of course denied that claim, and most historians agree
with him (Nikolic´ 1974). One consequence is that the claim
that the Ancients ‘‘proved the irrationality of the square root
of two’’ cannot be unqualifiedly maintained either. More
recently, discussions were raised about the so-called
‘‘geometric algebra,’’ that is, the claim (for instance defen-
ded by B. L. van der Waerden and meanwhile refuted by
historians) that some of Euclid’s geometric theorems have
to be interpreted as translations of historically preexisting
algebraic problems and equations.6
Historians know, of course, that absolute historical
‘‘accuracy’’ cannot be attained in modern presentations and
that they have to refer to modern vocabulary to make the
very process of creation understandable.7 In discussing
Euclid’s Elements, the problem starts with the question as to
what extent it is legitimate to replace the purely verbal
original formulation throughout the book by some other,
modernized one that uses symbols. In the special case of
the Pythagorean-Euclidean number theory, Euclid’s dress-
ing up of the theorems in geometric clothing, without
genuinely geometric content, adds to the problem.
In the case of Euclid’s Elements, one is best served
relying on Bernard Vitrac’s careful French edition (1990–
2001) with very detailed commentary,8 which is still based
(as is the most famous English edition by Thomas Heath
from 1908 and 1925) on the Greek text, edited by the
Danish historian J. L. Heiberg in 1883–1885.9 Vitrac says in
his edition that—because of a scarcity of original sources—
each modern specialist of Greek number theory provides a
different interpretation (Vitrac 1994: 288). This should warn
us, the nonspecialists, to restrict our discussion basically to
the modern reception of what the specialists agree is a
reliable text of Euclid’s theorem IX, 20 and other theorems
related to it.
Vitrac’s and Heath’s commentaries (and others) do not
contribute many answers to my questions: to what extent is
Euclid’s theorem IX, 20 constructive or its proof indirect,
what kind of infinity does it claim, and how has the
theorem been interpreted by modern mathematicians.
Nevertheless I will try to use their and other Euclid scholars’
expertise to provide nuancing counterbalance against some
formulations that necessarily have to be somewhat simpli-
fying so as to be short and understandable.
My first question is admittedly speculative and cannot be
answered in this article (although an answer would shed
light on our problems): Why did Euclid prove the ‘‘infini-
tude of primes’’ in the first place?
The proof comes in book IX of the Elements, as prop-
osition 20, almost at the end of the ‘‘number-theoretic’’
(‘‘Pythagorean’’) books VII through IX, whereas the deci-
sive instruments and propositions, particularly the
Euclidean algorithm and propositions close (though not
4The focus of the article is not, however, on the reception of Euclid’s work during the more than 2000 years since its creation, which would require special linguistic
(including Arabic!), philologic, and philosophical qualifications. Although H&W refer, mostly critically and summarily, to an impressive number of 147 publications, I will
quote many fewer modern mathematicians. However, I will refer to a few additional ones (Hilbert, Weil). In addition I will use historical literature, above all B. Vitrac’s
edition of the Elements.
5More on that later, in connection with an analysis of Euclid’s proof.
6Concerns about this notion were already articulated in the late 1960s by A. Szabo´, indicated in Knorr (1975), and formulated polemically by Unguru (1975).
7We will speak frequently, for instance, about ‘‘sets of primes’’ below, without, however, assuming modern set-theoretical operations and notions coming with it.
8Of course the French language might constitute a barrier to the reception of Vitrac’s edition in our modern, largely English-speaking world. We will in the following refer
to volume 2 of this edition, containing books V–IX of the Elements, as Vitrac (1994).
9Cf. June Barrow-Green (2006) for an overview of earlier English editions of the Elements.
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fully equivalent) to the fundamental theorem of arithmetic,
are presented in the beginning and in the middle of book
VII. The algorithm and the propositions are frequently used
in Euclid’s number-theoretic books, but his theorem on the
‘‘infinitude’’ of primes is not used at all. The remaining
propositions of book IX, 21 through 36, are mainly about
the properties of odd and even numbers.10 Thus theorem
IX, 20 appears isolated. Did Euclid see it as the demon-
stration of a kind of ideal, platonic existence of infinitely
many primes, something like the last theorem of the Ele-
ments, proposition XIII, 18, in which he proves that there
exist no more than 5 platonic polyhedra?11 That might
explain why a ‘‘weakly constructive’’ proof sufficed for him:
he apparently needed the additional primes only in a
general ‘‘philosophical’’ sense, not to prove other
theorems.
What Did Euclid Really Claim and Prove and What Is
Its Modern Counterpart?
Euclid does not really claim or prove the infinitude of
primes. What he says and proves in IX, 20 is:
ECL (Euclid’s claim):
‘‘Prime numbers are more than any assigned multitude
of prime numbers.’’
It may appear pedantic and trivial to stress,12 but it is
historically a relevant fact that it requires a very simple, yet
indirect argument to derive from this statement the fol-
lowing modern claim:
MCL (Modern claim of the infinitude of primes, in the
Cantorian sense of actual infinity):
‘‘There exist infinitely many primes.’’
To derive the MCL we make the (wrong) assumption
that the finite ‘‘assigned multitude’’ is ‘‘complete’’ (contains
all natural numbers that fall under the definition of a prime
number). That is, the (finite) ‘‘assigned multitude’’ must
contain all primes up to a maximum, which is not stipulated
in Euclid’s original proof. This explains why most modern
presentations of Euclid’s proof use uninterrupted sequen-
ces of primes (beginning with 2) and their products
(primorials) as starting points. Although the infinitude fol-
lows easily from contradiction, one could also argue that
this conclusion of infinitude can be drawn ‘‘constructively’’
in the sense of a continued counting of a potentially infinite
set of prime numbers.13
Modern misinterpretations of ECL in the sense of MCL
lead to the insinuation that Euclid’s proof was basically or
substantially by contradiction. Various forms of MIP
(Modern Infinitude Proofs) sometimes are substantially
indirect proofs (as in the cases of Dirichlet [1863] and Hardy
[1908] to be discussed later) and sometimes claim to be
indirect although they follow closely the Euclidean original
(as in the case of another proof by Hardy of 1938 and
1940).
To be sure, indirect proofs were not foreign to the
Greeks (they rather invented them) and many Greek
philosophers/scientists (among them mathematically
highly educated individuals such as Plato and Eudoxus,
who stood behind Euclid’s Elements with their spirit and/
or results) speculated about infinity.14 Andre´ Weil, who
was deeply interested in the history of number theory,
pointed to book X, def. 3 of the Elements to show that
Euclid was not averse in principle to talking about
infinity. At the same time, Weil uses that example to
caution readers not to expect too much impact of the
philosophical positions of Greek mathematicians on their
work:
The views of Greek philosophers about the infinite may
be of great interest as such; but are we really to believe
that they had great influence on the work of Greek
mathematicians? Because of them, we are told, Euclid
had to refrain from saying that there are infinitely many
primes, and had to express fact that differently. How is it
then that, a few pages later, he stated that ‘‘there exist
infinitely many lines’’ incommensurable with a given
one?15
Thus one may never fully know whether Euclid added in
his mind such an indirect proof, leading him from ECL
(which he proved) to MCL. But this question does not
affect at all the problem of whether his proof, as we
have inherited it, was (logically) indirect, that is, by
contradiction.
What we know for sure, however, is Euclid’s proof of
ECL and that it was done by a (weak) construction that can
be considered as performing the following assignment:
ECO (Euclid’s construction):
‘‘Given a finite number of primes, find at least one
additional prime.’’
Constructions occur in almost all theorems in Euclid’s
Elements, at least as auxiliary methods. Constructions are
usually also applied in proofs of theorems that do not ask
for constructions or that do not talk about the existence of
mathematical objects, but only about properties. The
10This was also observed by David E. Joyce in his online version of Heath’s English edition, which is quoted later. Vitrac (1994: 86), calls these last theorems
‘‘enigmatic,’’ meaning that their connection to the preceding theorems of the arithmetic books is problematic anyway.
11This comparison seems also relevant with respect to our central question of constructiveness: the construction of the five platonic polyhedra in propositions 13
through 17 of book XIII requires incomparably more effort than the ‘‘negative’’ result in proposition 18 that there are no more than the five regular polyhedra. Like
Euclid’s theorem on the infinitude of primes, his last theorem in book XIII, 18 obviously remains without application in the Elements, because it comes last. Vitrac (1994:
273) cautions against jumping too easily to the assumption that Euclid was a Platonist.
12We do not go quite so far though as putting ‘‘proof of the infinitude of primes’’ into quotation marks in the title.
13The resulting infinitude would, of course, not necessarily be complete. Cf. for instance Graham/Knuth/Patashnik (1989: 108) where such an infinitude is recursively
constructed with the help of the Euclidean algorithm and the auxiliary notion of relatively prime ‘‘Euclid numbers.’’ Vitrac (1994: 445) stresses that this infinity is fully
compatible with Aristotle’s notion of potential infinity.
14However, in mathematics itself they usually treated infinity indirectly (as for instance in Eudoxus’ famous notion of proportion in book V of the Elements) and preferred
the safety of the finitely many steps in mathematical constructions. Of course this is related to the fact that the Greeks did not possess modern analysis.
15Weil (1978: 230). Knorr (1975: 233) refers to the remark in Euclid as an ‘‘anomaly,’’ because it is not a definition but seems to promise a theorem for which one has,
however, to ‘‘wait in vain.’’
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majority of theorems in the Elements are of this kind.16 The
most famous example is probably the ‘‘theorem of Pytha-
goras’’ in book I, theorem 47. Some propositions, however,
are explicitly formulated as construction assignments, and
the latter—combined with their solution that then fol-
lows—have to be understood as ‘‘construction theorems.’’
The best known of this kind in the ‘‘number-theoretic’’
books VII–IX is the so-called ‘‘Euclidean algorithm,’’
namely proposition VII, 2:
‘‘Given two numbers not prime to one another, to find
their greatest common measure.’’17
Expressed in modern words, in Euclid’s number theory,
constructions are usually performed by the four funda-
mental operations of arithmetic, in particular addition and
multiplication, which in the Elements appear in geometric
clothing.18 But also in the number-theoretic books one
finds some tendency to hide constructions in favor of
properties. Thus ECO is not formulated separately in the
Elements but it appears as the proof method in proposition
IX, 20 with its claim ECL. I will argue in the following also
that the use of the notion of the least common multiple in
ECO instead of the more constructive notion of a product
seems to indicate this predilection for logical structure and
contributes to the underestimation of the constructive
character of Euclid’s theorem of the infinitude of primes.
Euclid’s Proof of ECL in IX, 20 Based on ECO
It is necessary to recall Euclid’s proof in some detail as a point
of reference to understand which elements or steps of it have
been changed or deleted in modern proofs. Some analysis of
the structure and methods of Euclid’s proof is also needed.
The following short summary of proof methods is (for the
convenience ofmodern readers) based on one simplification
compared to the original formulation. As will become clear
from the text that follows, the summary replaces Euclid’s
notion of ‘‘composite’’ number (‘‘which is measured by some
[smaller] number’’) by ‘‘product’’ of numbers. Both notions
occur in Euclid; they are differently defined (Vitrac 1994:
258), the first based on properties, the second on construc-
tion, but they are logically equivalent.
Euclid’s proof is then based on two simple lemmas (L1 and
L2), and on one not-too-deep theorem (T). Whereas theorem
T is proposition VII, 31 in Euclid’s Elements, the two lemmas
do not explicitly appear in the Elements, but they follow easily
from the notion of the product of natural numbers.
L1: The product of any two numbers (none of them the
unit) is bigger than either of them.
L2: A product of n numbers (none of them the unit) + 1
is not divisible by any of these numbers.
T: Any product of numbers (none of them the unit) is
divisible by a prime number.
L2 refers to a legitimately constructed number P + 1,
which is the main idea of the proof, T continues
the construction based on the possibility of repeated division.
Euclid, Elements, book IX, proposition 20:
ECL: ‘‘Prime numbers are more than any assigned
multitude of prime numbers.’’
Proof (ECO):19
Take the least number DE measured by A, B, and C. Add
the unit DF to DE.
Then EF is either prime or not.
First, let it be prime. Then the prime numbers A, B,
C, and EF havebeen found,whicharemore than A,B, and C.
Next, let EF not be prime. Therefore it is measured by
some prime number [VII, 31].20
Let it be measured by the prime number G.
I say that G is not the same with any of the numbers A,
B, and C.
 
Let A, B, and C be the assigned prime numbers. 
I say that there are more prime numbers than A, 
B, and C. 
16There is an old historical discussion among historians of Greek mathematics (Wilbur Knorr, David Fowler, etc.) that continues today about the relation between
constructive and deductive principles in the mathematics of the time and the influence of philosophy on that relationship.
17This algorithm was certainly mathematically deeper than ECO and ECL, and Donald Knuth called it the ‘‘granddaddy of all algorithms’’ (Knuth 1981: 318). The
Euclidean algorithm is not needed for Euclid’s proof in IX, 20, although finding the greatest common divisor is closely related to finding the least common multiple LCM,
which is assumed in IX, 20. The reason is that the LCM is trivial for prime numbers. However, as remarked earlier, Graham/Knuth/Patashnik (1989: 108) use the
Euclidean algorithm to construct an infinitude of primes recursively.
18The essentially arithmetic content of the ‘‘number-theoretic books VII–IX’’ in the Elements is stressed by Knorr (1976). Vitrac (1994, 277) emphasizes differences in
detail between the constructions of book I in the Elements and the constructions in the number-theoretic books.
19David E. Joyce uses Heath’s edition from 1908 for his online edition at the website of Clark University, from which we have quoted here:
http://aleph0.clarku.edu/*djoyce/java/elements/elements.html. Figures have been added in Heath/Joyce and in some other editions for explanation. Heath/Joyce
follow closely the Greek version in J. L. Heiberg’s edition of 1883–1885, replacing the Greek letters in the same alphabetic order. Cf. page 271 of the bilingual online
edition by Richard Fitzpatrick at http://farside.ph.utexas.edu/euclid/elements.pdf. Although it does not include genuine geometric content, the figure is useful, because
the text speaks of the least common multiple DE, and one would expect the unit to be called EF, not DF. The picture explains that. I thank June Barrow-Green for this
observation.
20Vitrac 1994, 444, refers here to VII, 32 instead, which is a simple conclusion of VII, 31, but does not contain the construction of the divisor. Explicit reference to
previous theorems (as explanation) is usually not contained in Euclid’s text and is not added in Heiberg’s Greek edition.
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If possible, let it be so. Now A, B, and C measure
DE, therefore G also measures DE. But it also measures
EF. Therefore G, being a number, measures the remainder,
the unit DF, which is absurd.
Therefore G is not the same with any one of the num-
bers A, B, and C. And by hypothesis, it is prime. Therefore
the prime numbers A, B, C, and G have been found, which
are more than the assigned multitude of A, B, and C.
Therefore, prime numbers are more than any assigned
multitude of prime numbers.
Q. E. D.
Paraphrasing of the Proof:
Given any finite set S of primes, one considers (con-
structs) their product P [Euclid uses for some not fully
clear reason21 the LCM instead of the product; R. S.-S.]
and adds the unit 1. If P + 1 is a prime, one has found
an additional prime, which means a prime that is not in
the original set S (L1). If P + 1 is not a prime, it is
divided by a prime (T). This latter prime cannot, how-
ever, be one of the primes in the original finite set either,
because in this case it could not divide P + 1 (L2).
Therefore we have also in this case found an additional
prime that does not lie in the original set S of prime
numbers assumed.
This is a paraphrasing of Euclid’s proof (or of what has
come down to us in handwritten copies and in various
Arabic, Latin, and modern translations of the Greek
original), which follows closely Heiberg’s Greek edition
of Euclid’s text, although partly using modern vocabulary
(set).
It is remarkable that the use of lemma L1 is not expressly
mentioned or argued within Euclid’s proof. It is simpler
than L2 but in its content closely related to it. It shows that
P + 1 (regardless of whether P is the LCM or the product of
all given primes) is bigger than any prime in S and therefore
cannot be one of these primes. However, L1 is often
emphasized in modern presentations of the theorem, for
instance in the one by Dirichlet to be mentioned in the text
that follows. L1 is necessary for Euclid’s proof to show that
P + 1 lies outside S.
Is Euclid’s Proof One by Contradiction (in
Addition to Being One by Construction)?
An indirect proof of the infinitude of primes has to be
based on the (false) assumption that the given finite set of
primes is ‘‘complete.’’ Now the question arises as to whe-
ther Euclid’s proof could at the same time—in addition to
being weakly constructive—be interpreted as an indirect
one, by assuming that S comprises all primes and by dis-
proving this assumption. In other words, could one
conclude MCL immediately from the original proof ECO?
After all, it seems at first glance that S could well have been
assumed by Euclid to be both finite and complete. Thus the
latter assumption would have been disproved by ECO and
Euclid would have produced a contradiction.
H&W make much of the fact that Euclid does not
expressly say that the proof uses the assumption that S is
complete. However Euclid (and many other mathemati-
cians with him, even today) does not always fully explain
what he does and intends. We conclude, as a matter of
course, that in Euclid the three numbers A, B, C stand for
an arbitrary finite set of primes, the cardinality of which
we would today describe by the indeterminate number n.
We take for granted that Euclid saw that the new prime
he had ‘‘constructed’’ was B P + 1. So why not assume
that he had thoughts about the completeness of S as
well?
We do, however, have a compelling and very simple
argument to discard the hypothesis that Euclid assumed S
to be complete.22 This argument lies, of course, in the
proof itself. In it Euclid concludes with the help of L1 that
P + 1 lies outside S. But he then considers as one of two
possible cases the one that P + 1 could be prime. But this
is a conclusion that Euclid never would have drawn under
the assumption that S was complete. To perform a reductio
ad absurdum requires, of course, concluding correctly
from a hypothesis that one wants to disprove. Indeed, Di-
richlet in his (indirect) proof (see later), which assumes the
completeness of S, discards immediately the possibility of
P + 1 being prime.
Note that Euclid’s proof, although not globally assuming
the completeness of primes, nevertheless uses locally
‘‘indirect arguments’’ as steps in the proof. And this use
occurs even on two levels, one open and one concealed. In
the middle of the proof, the assumption of P + 1 being
divisible by a prime in S is refuted with the help of lemma
L2. And on a more hidden level: The proof of theorem T
‘‘Any product of numbers (none of them the unit) is
divisible by a prime number’’ uses an indirect argument,
which in Heath’s English edition appears within the proof
of VII, 31 as:
Thus, if the investigation be continued in this way, some
prime number will be found which will measure the
number before it, which will also measure A. For, if it is
not found, an infinite series of numbers will measure the
number A, each of which is less than the other: which is
impossible in numbers.
Vitrac in his French edition of the Elements emphasizes that
we have an infinity argument here that is reminiscent of the
‘‘descent infinite which has been made famous by Fermat.’’
(Vitrac 1994: 341). To be sure, this ‘‘hidden’’ indirect
argument is of no immediate concern when deciding
whether Euclid’s proof in IX, 20 is ‘‘indirect,’’ because
theorem T (= VII, 31) is accepted in the proof as a
mathematical fact. However, the use of T nevertheless
contributes to the ‘‘feeling’’ that we have to do with indirect
arguments, because theorem T is obviously partly respon-
sible for the ‘‘weak’’ constructiveness of IX, 20. This is even
more true of the unconcealed indirect argument mentioned
before. Because it seems difficult to rewrite these two
indirect arguments in the form of a direct conclusion
(which would imply that the indirect argument is merely
21The reason may be again the emphasis of properties over constructions.
22H&W mention this as well as an additional argument (p. 46).
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superficial),23 we are left with the result that the proof IX,
20 contains locally genuinely indirect arguments, but
globally it is not indirect because it does not assume the
completeness of the given finite set of primes.
Insinuating Contradiction and (Almost) Ignoring
Construction: In Particular in G. H. Hardy
H&W note that Euclid’s proof is misinterpreted by ‘‘no less
a number theorist’’ than G. H. Hardy (1877–1947) in his
Course of Pure Mathematics (1908). Because they do not
quote Hardy in detail and because this fascinating example
serves my further argument, I present here the full passage
from the original of 1908, which is repeated in subsequent
editions up to the sixth of 1933:24
Euclid’s proof is as follows. If there are only a finite
number of primes let them be l, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11,… N. Con-
sider the number l + (l. 2. 3. 5. 7. 11… N). This number is
evidently not divisible by any of 2, 3, 5, … N, since the
remainder when it is divided by any of these numbers is 1.
It is therefore not divisible by any prime save l,
and is therefore itself prime [my emphasis, R. S.-S.],
which is contrary to our hypothesis (Hardy 1908:
122/123).
Hardy, unlike Euclid, uses primorials in his proof, that is,
the products pn# of the first n primes. We will discuss this
change (maybe even distortion) further below. In addition,
Hardy assumes these n primes to form a complete set of
primes (‘‘there are only’’). Surprisingly, Hardy considers the
number 1 as a prime. But what is really striking is the claim
that P + 1 ‘‘is therefore itself prime.’’ An inexperienced
student can easily jump to the conclusion that P + 1 must
indeed be prime whatever prime number N one starts with.
This is, of course, not the case, as the famous and sim-
plest counterexample, p6# + 1 = 2 9 3 9 5 9 7 9 11 9
13 + 1 = 30,031 = 59 9 509, shows. Of course, we should
not assume that the great English number theorist was not
aware of the counterexample. To the contrary, he might
well have been ‘‘too aware’’ of it, thus committing a
‘‘pedagogical error.’’ Indeed, the conclusion P + 1 ‘‘is
therefore itself prime’’ might be convincing for the begin-
ner for two reasons: it is ‘‘confirmed’’ by the first five
‘‘Euclid numbers’’25 up to p5# + 1 = 2311, and it is sup-
ported by the intuitive, if misled, feeling that there cannot
be a divisor of P + 1 between N and P + 1. However, the
conclusion ‘‘is therefore itself prime’’ will be considered
‘‘absurd’’ by the mathematically educated and thus com-
pletes for him the reductio ad absurdum. Because one can
correctly deduce any statement from a wrong one, the
conclusion that P + 1 must be prime is one that should not
be too surprising for the educated mathematician.
Hardy does not bother to extend the last sentence of
his proof with a remark such as ‘‘…which is contrary to
our hypothesis, and the latter has therefore to be dis-
carded.’’ Hardy does not provide a definition of a prime
number in his 1908 book either, which would be
important to know for reconstructing his argument. He
apparently concluded along these lines: The constructed
number, which I will again call P + 1, is not divisible
by ‘‘any prime’’ in S (L2). P + 1 can therefore—because
of the completeness of S (assumption A) and theorem
T—not be composite and must be prime. But then it
follows from the completeness of S and from L2 that
P + 1 cannot be divisible by itself and thus cannot be
prime. This is a contradiction and it follows ‘‘non-A’’
(symbolically A), which is the original claim one wants
to prove.
Symbolically Hardy’s indirect modern proof of the
infinitude of primes MIP-H1908 can thus be written in the
following way, although he does not refer to the second
step of the argument in his verbal formulation:
ðH 1908Þ ½A
!L2þT ðP þ 1Þprime ^ ½A !L2 ðP þ 1Þ
:prime ! :AÞ
Compared to Euclid, Hardy—in addition to assuming the
completeness of S (assumption A)—exchanges the steps of
the proof, and he does not use lemma L1 at all. Instead of
(similar to a hypothetical indirect proof in Euclid) first con-
sidering the case of P + 1 being prime and recognizing it as a
contradiction to A because of L1, Hardy considers first P + 1
being composite and discards it as a contradiction to A
because of L2. By exchanging the steps of proof, he is left
with the conclusion that P + 1 is prime under the assump-
tion of A, which is then finally recognized as a contradiction.
One could argue that Hardy liked to play the logical
game to the end and to the extreme, namely to conclude
the absurd statement that P + 1 is ‘‘prime’’ under the
(wrong) assumption of A. He seems, however, less inter-
ested in the constructive conclusion of Euclid’s proof,
which considers the divisibility of P + 1 as a composite
number. Thus, Hardy distorts Euclid’s proof ECO in several
respects, assuming the completeness of S, using primorials,
and changing the steps in Euclid’s arguments. And one
realizes that the order of steps and the wording matter
when one analyses the various forms of the presentation of
Euclid’s proof.
Compare now Hardy’s proof with the one by Dirichlet in
the posthumous edition of his Number Theory of 1863.26
Starting with the maximum prime p in the finite set S (which
is assumed to be complete) and (like Hardy after him)
using primorials, Dirichlet continues:
Each number greater than p must be composite and
hence divisible by at least one of these primes. But it is
very easy to construct a number greater than p and not
divisible by any of the primes: just construct the product
23Note that any constructive proof can be rewritten as an indirect proof by assuming the opposite. But it should be superficial to acknowledge the latter as a genuine
indirect proof.
24I have checked the sixth edition of 1933 and can confirm that Hardy changes the passage for the first time in the seventh edition of 1938, which he calls ‘‘revised and
re-set.’’ See below.
25This is historically clearly a misnomer. ‘‘Euclid number’’ as used in Graham/Knuth/Patashnik (1989) is, however, somewhat closer to Euclid.
26Dirichlet 1863 and 1999, pp. 15–16, edited by R. Dedekind 1863 and translated into English by J. Stillwell in 1999. This is mentioned without discussion in Hardy
(2013), which contains some additional remarks and slight corrections to H&W (2009).
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of the primes from 2 to p and add l (Dirichlet 1863/1999,
10).
From lemma L2, Dirichlet then concludes a contradiction to
the conclusion that P + 1 is composite. A comparison with
Euclid is—once again—difficult because of the assumption
of the completeness of S in Dirichlet. However, one can say
that, in a sense, Dirichlet is more faithful than Hardy to
Euclid’s original proof, because—like Euclid—he first
(implicitly) considers P + 1 to be prime, but then discards
this possibility under the assumption of A, because P + 1 is
greater than p. Dirichlet thus even uses expressly lemma L1,
which is hidden in Euclid. That lemma implies that because
of the multiplication that produces P + 1, the latter number
must lie outside the original set S.
Symbolically one could write Dirichlet’s indirect proof
MIP-D1863 in the following way:
ðD 1863Þ ½A
!L1 ðP þ 1Þcomposite ^ ½A !L2 ðP þ 1Þ
:composite ! :A
Dirichlet’s proof seems to me one of the shortest and most
elegant proofs of MCL, that is, the infinitude of primes. It
uses—as any other proof that connects to Euclid—the main
constructive idea, namely to construct and investigate the
number P + 1. However Dirichlet—like Hardy after him—
is more interested in the fact of infinitude (MCL) than in the
algorithmic problem of finding an additional prime in
finitely many steps. Given that Dirichlet himself had proven
much sharper results on the location of the infinitely many
primes27 than can be concluded from ECO, this lack of
interest is not surprising.
Why is it that Dirichlet’s indirect proof appears more
natural and less logically confusing for beginners than
Hardy’s of 1908? One reason is that the (absurd) conclusion
that P + 1 should be composite is refuted by a much
simpler numerical counterexample (2 9 3 + 1 = 7). The
stronger pedagogic appeal in Dirichlet seems to me also a
result of Dirichlet following closer to Euclid’s well-known
proof and using—unlike Hardy—the very intuitive lemma
L1. One could even argue that Dirichlet is more pedagogic
than Euclid, that is, Dirichlet shows the mathematical
instruments that he uses more clearly than Euclid. Indeed,
one should not look at modern presentations of Euclid only
under the perspective of distortion but also under the point
of view of logical clarification.
Apparently, in the end Hardy himself recognized his
‘‘pedagogical error.’’ In the seventh edition of 1938 of his
book (in which he also no longer considered 1 to be a
prime) Hardy wrote:
There are however, as was first shown byEuclid, infinitely
many primes. Euclid’s proof is as follows. Let 2, 3, 5,… pN
be all the primes up to pN, and let P = (2.3.5… pN) + 1.
Then P is not divisible by any of 2, 3, 5, …, pN . Hence
either P is prime, or P is divisible by a prime p between pN
and P. In either case there is a prime greater than pN
and so an infinity of primes (Hardy 1938, p. 125).
Despite this dramatic change in the later editions of his
Course of Pure Mathematics and his return to Euclid’s
original proof, Hardy continued to misunderstand the latter
as one by contradiction. Hardy gave Euclid’s proof a
prominent place in his famous Apology of 1940, where he
presented basically the same newly corrected version of the
proof from his Course:
The proof is by reductio ad absurdum, and reductio ad
absurdum, which Euclid loved so much, is one of a
mathematician’s finest weapons. It is a far finer gambit
than any chess gambit: a chess player may offer the
sacrifice of a pawn or even a piece, but a mathematician
offers the game (Hardy 1940: 92).
But at the same time and in the same book of 1940, Hardy
explained that Euclid’s theorem is just a fundamental result
about the infinitude of primes and that it was limited in its
possible applications.
H&W rightly find that presentations such as the one by
Hardy in 1908, which insinuate a proof by contradiction
and neglect construction, lack ‘‘simplicity,’’ and that
Euclid’s proof was ‘‘simpler.’’ I believe that Euclid’s proof is,
indeed, ‘‘simpler’’ because it is better pedagogically and
does not resort to wording that makes the notion of ‘‘pri-
mality’’ contingent on absurd assumptions. However, if
they mean that Euclid’s proof is simpler because (!) it is
constructive, I disagree. On the contrary, one could argue
that a proof purely by contradiction is simpler because it
has less content.28
Least Common Multiple, Primorials, Factorials:
The Logical Equivalence of the Proofs
Let’s return to the question I asked at the beginning: is the
‘‘spirit’’ and ‘‘content’’ of Euclid’s proof preserved in mod-
ern presentations that use primorials or even factorials,
although Euclid uses products of any finite number of
given primes? Does this actually affect the presentation of
the ‘‘substance’’ of Euclid’s result?
H&W rightly criticize remarks such as this one by Tobias
Dantzig (1884–1956), the father of the better-known
mathematician George Dantzig:
In this proof Euclid introduces for the first time in history
what we call today factorial numbers (Dantzig, quoted
by Hardy/Woodgold 2009: 47).
This was even less faithful to Euclid than the use of
primorials. Of course an historian has to reject such wrong
attributions to original sources when they come as bluntly
and as unnuanced as in Dantzig’s book. A similar remark
applies to Dickson’s book (1919), which the author calls
himself a ‘‘History of Number Theory.’’29
Now we find another use of factorials in an allusion to
Euclid’s proof in David Hilbert’s talk ‘‘U¨ber das
27Namely, the existence of an infinitude of primes in arithmetic sequences.
28For example, as described earlier, it is simpler to prove the actual infinitude of all primes, because of the additional indirect argument that leads to MCL, than to
construct the potential infinitude of particular sets of primes with the help of ECO.
29Dickson (1919: 413) says mistakenly that he quotes directly from Heiberg’s Greek edition when he alleges that Euclid used primorials. Thanks go to June Barrow-
Green for alerting me to Dickson.
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Unendliche’’ (On the Infinite) in the context of a discussion
of ‘‘finitism.’’ This talk may have influenced later presen-
tations of Euclid’s theorem.30 Indeed, in the English
translation by the remarkable German mathematician and
musician Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg,31 we read:
By means of Euclid’s well-known procedure we can,
completely within the framework of the attitude we have
adopted [i.e., the ‘‘finitist’’ in Hilbert’s sense as described in
his quote that follows, R. S.-S.], prove the theorem that
betweenp + l andp! + l there certainly exists anewprime
number. This proposition itself, moreover, is completely in
conformity with our finitist attitude. For ‘‘there exists’’ here
serves merely to abbreviate the proposition:
Certainly p + l or p + 2 or p + 3 or … or p! + l is a
prime number.
But let us go on. Obviously, to say there exists a prime
number that (1) is[ p and (2) is at the same
time B p! + 1 would amount to the same thing, and this
leads us to formulate a proposition that expresses only a
part of Euclid’s assertion, namely: there exists a prime
number that is [p. So far as content is concerned, this is
a much weaker assertion, stating only a part of Euclid’s
proposition; nevertheless, no matter how harmless the
transition appears to be, there is a leap into the transfi-
nite when this partial proposition, taken out of the
context above, is stated as an independent assertion.
How can that be? We have here an existential proposition
with ‘‘there exists.’’ To be sure, we already had one in
Euclid’s theorem.But the latter,with its ‘‘thereexists,’’was, as
I have already said, merely another, shorter expression for
‘‘p + 1 or p + 2 or p + 3 or . . . or p! + 1 is a prime
number,’’
just as, instead of saying: This piece of chalk is red or
that piece of chalk is red or… or the piece of chalk over
there is red, I say more briefly: Among these pieces of
chalk there exists a red one. An assertion of this kind,
that in a finite totality ‘‘there exists’’ an object having a
certain property, is completely in conformity with our
finitist attitude. On the other hand, the expression
‘‘p + l or p + 2 or p + 3 or … ad infinitum is a prime
number’’
is, as it were, an infinite logical product,32 and such a
passage to the infinite is no more permitted without
special investigation and perhaps certain precautionary
measures than the passage from a finite to an infinite
product in analysis, and initially it has no meaning at all.
In general, from the finitist point of view an existential
proposition of the form ‘‘There exists a number having
this or that property’’ has meaning only as a partial
proposition, that is, as part of a proposition that is more
precisely determined but whose exact content is unes-
sential for many applications (Hilbert 1925: 377–378).
Now Hilbert is known not to have been very history-minded,
and he was usually not very concerned about accuracy in his
allusions to thehistory of his discipline. In the example under
discussion here, Hilbert does not give any details about
Euclid’s proof either. However, his claim that Euclid reached
two different conclusions, namely ‘‘a much weaker asser-
tion’’ about infinitely many primes and a stronger one
specifying a finite set where the additional primes exist is in
good agreement with what I argued earlier.
It remains to be seen whether Hilbert provided an
accurate description of the conclusions that could be drawn
from ‘‘Euclid’s well-known procedure,’’ in particular, how
much the use of factorials changed Euclid’s original argu-
ment. It is of course obvious that p! is divisible by all natural
numbers \ p, in particular by all primes \ p. If p! + 1 is not
prime, it is divisible by a prime according Euclid VII, 31
(theorem T). This prime must be smaller than the usually
very big number p!, but bigger than p, because otherwise
the classic contradiction from Euclid’s theorem of a division
with a remainder\ 1 occurs. Therefore there must be a
prime between p + 1 and p!. Thus the main idea is indeed
analogous to Euclid; Hilbert’s prime number p can be
considered as the biggest prime number in Euclid’s set S.
Hilbert has thus shown, with the same argument as Euclid,
that there exists a prime number bigger than any given
prime number p and smaller than an upper limit depending
on a concrete natural number that can be calculated from p.
Whereas Euclid proves that there exists a larger set (!) of
prime numbers than any finite set of prime numbers, Hil-
bert proves that there exists a larger prime number than any
given prime number. Both Euclid and Hilbert provide
concrete boundaries for the new set or the new number.
Both proofs are logically equivalent, because any finite set
of numbers has a largest element and conversely one can
find (for instance with the well-known sieve of Eratosthe-
nes) to a given p all prime numbers smaller than it and thus
one can find any of the upper limits for an additional prime.
The Obsolescence of Euclid’s Proof and Some
Concluding Remarks
I find three main historical reasons for the misrepresenta-
tion of Euclid’s proof as indirect.
The first reason is historical fashion. Indeed, the refer-
ence of modern, logically minded mathematicians (from
the second half of the 19th and a good part of the 20th
centuries) to the old ideal of Euclid’s Elements after several
‘‘constructive centuries’’ (Descartes through Euler) is not
coincidental. They know that Greek mathematicians used
30However, Mesˇtrovic´ (2012: 9) mentions an article by H. Brocard of 1915 that seems to indicate that Charles Hermite already used factorials for the presentation of
Euclid’s proof.
31Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg (1927–1996) was a German-born mathematician who worked at I.B.M. and had a simultaneous career as a conductor. He served for a
while as assistant conductor to Leonard Bernstein at the New York Philharmonic. Cf. his obituary in The New York Times, published October 28, 1996, also accessible
online.
32Editor Jan van Heijenoort adds here the following footnote: ‘‘It is rather a logical sum or disjunction. In the version published in Grundlagen der Geometrie (1930),
‘logisches Produkt’ is replaced by ‘Oder-Verknu¨pfung’.’’
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indirect proofs widely and thus they read into Euclid what
they want to stress. The modern mathematicians are helped
by the fact that Euclid himself in the Elements downplayed
the constructive aspects of the proofs or at least did not
mention them in the statements of many theorems. This in
particular is the case for Euclid’s theorem of the infinitude
of primes, which does not mention in its claim the mainly
constructive nature of the proof. From the 1960s, mathe-
maticians such as D. Knuth and G. Po´lya, and philosophers
such as I. Lakatos, have contributed with their work to a
renaissance of constructive and algorithmic methodologies
in mathematics. This was of course gradually supported by
the rise of data technology and computer science, which
left its mark in prime number theory as well, the prime
numbers finding unexpected applications in coding theory
and so forth, for example, in the banking business.
The second historical reason for misinterpreting Euclid’s
proof as one by contradiction is the weak form of con-
structiveness that does not provide an effective procedure
to find individual primes: Euclid constructed a finite set of
numbers within which the existence of an additional prime
was guaranteed; however this additional prime (or primes)
can only be found by testing the elements of this finite set
consecutively—and apparently leaving the mathematician
without information about a preferential order—for pri-
mality. David Hilbert referred to this weaker notion of
construction, which is exhibited by Euclid’s proof, in the
context of his ‘‘finitist’’ approach to the foundations of
mathematics in the 1920s and 1930s. The weak construc-
tiveness is also connected to a partial and ‘‘local’’ use of
indirect arguments within the proof. One gets the impres-
sion that some modern mathematicians looking at Euclid’s
weak construction compare it with some modern proofs by
contradiction, not of Euclid’s theorem, but, for instance, in
set theory, which indeed are not constructive in any sense.
There is in my opinion, however, a third historical reason,
no less important, for many modern authors to insinuate an
indirect proof of Euclid’s theorem and to downplay its con-
structiveness. On this historical reason I will elaborate a bit in
these concluding remarks. Although the infinitude of primes
is still a basic and important fact in number theory, the insight
of modern mathematicians into the distribution of primes
goes far beyond what is indicated in Euclid’s constructive
proof, which is therefore mathematically obsolete, the entire
theorem being a very trivial one. Indeed, Euclid’s proof, both
in its original and in its modern forms, offers little information
about the distribution of primes. According to Euclid’s ori-
ginal proof, additional primes can also be sought below the
biggest given prime, as the simple examples 3 9 5 + 1 = 16
and 2 9 7 + 1 = 15 show. Euclid’s original argument
allows, for example, for any prime p [ 2 to conclude the
existence of an additional prime\ 2p. However, Euclid’s
proof does not rule out that this prime should be smaller than
p: it was only shown much later by P. L. Chebysev (1850),
with stronger analytical methods, that in any case there
always exists a prime between p and 2p.33 That there can at
the same time exist additional primes smaller than p and
between p and 2p is shown for p = 7 and the example
2 9 7 + 1 = 15. Thus Chebysev’s result is much sharper
than Euclid’s in this case.
Hardy and Wright (1938) reflect on the conclusions that
can be drawn from Euclid’s proof for p(x), the number of
primes below x. They present ECO very close to Euclid’s
spirit as in Hardy’s corrected version discussed earlier.
Then they present, based on the use of primorials, upper
limits for the increase of pn which is the value of the nth
prime, and lower limits for p(x). Hardy’s and Wright’s dis-
cussion shows that the two mathematicians were well
aware of the constructive side of Euclid’s proof, but that
they deemed its potential to be ‘‘absurdly weak’’34 com-
pared to what was already known at the time about the
distribution of primes, based for instance on the (logarith-
mic) prime number theorem (proven in 1896 by Hadamard
and de la Valle´e Poussin) and other more refined results.
This provides further confirmation of the reason for G. H.
Hardy’s mistaken claim that Euclid’s argument was mainly
by contradiction. Euclid’s theorem apparently was to him
only of a general ‘‘philosophical’’ interest, not a concrete
help for finding prime numbers.
One gains still another perspective on the constructive/
algorithmic side of Euclid’s theorem when looking, for
instance, at the book by Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey,
which uses factorials:
7.10Example (Thenext prime). Let f (x) = the least y such
that x \ y and y is prime. The relation x \ y & y is prime is
primitive recursive, using Example 7.5. Hence the func-
tion f is recursive by the preceding proposition. There is a
theorem in Euclid’s Elements that tells us that for any given
number x there exists a prime y [ x, from which we know
that our function f is total. But actually, the proof in Euclid
shows that there is a prime y [ x with y B x! + 1. Since
the factorial function is primitive recursive, the Corollary
7.8 applies to show that f is actually primitive recursive
(Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey 1980: 79).
Thus modern work on logic and computability apparently
has drawn—at least on a theoretical level—some inspira-
tion from the constructive part of Euclid’s proof, here in
Boolos et al, in connection with the theory of primitive
recursive relations and assuming the use of factorials.35
But Boolos et al do not share the concerns of some
‘‘heterodox mathematicians who reject certain principles of
logic.’’ Referring to Hilbert’s ‘‘finitism,’’ they point to the
power of modern, analytical mathematics, interestingly
enough in a number-theoretic context:
On the plane of mathematical practice, Hilbert insisted, a
detour through the ‘‘ideal’’ is often the shortest route to a
‘‘contentful’’ result. (For example, Chebyshev’s theorem
that there is a prime between any number and its double
33Hardy and Wright (1938: 13). See the later remark quoted from Boolos et al (1980: 238). The theorem is valid even for arbitrary n, not necessarily prime.
34Cf. a similar remark in Mesˇtrovic´ (2012: 30), who calls it a ‘‘horrible bound.’’
35Cf. also Graham, Knuth, and Patashnik (1989), as quoted earlier, and the note by Mullin (1963) who constructs with the ‘‘Euclidean idea’’ of the number P + 1 a
sequence of primes that never generates any prime twice. Mullin refers directly back to E. L. Post’s theory of recursively enumerable sets of positive integers and their
decision problems (1944). Sequences of primes have certainly played an increasing role in mathematical logic, for instance in the method of Go¨delization.
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was proved not in some ‘‘finitistic,’’ ‘‘constructive,’’
directly computational way, but by an argument involving
applying calculus to functions whose arguments and
values are imaginary numbers.) (Boolos, Burgess, and
Jeffrey 1980: 238).
As is well known, Hilbert’s version of ‘‘finitism’’ was, in
reality, a defense strategy to save classic, infinitist mathe-
matics. Also, G. H. Hardy was not willing to renounce the
use of modern analysis in number theory when in his A
Mathematician’s Apology he said about Euclid’s theorem:
The proof can be rearranged to avoid a reductio, and
logicians of some schools would prefer it should be
(Hardy 1940: 94).
It is not fully clear what Hardy meant by rearrangement. I
suspect that he did not have in mind a simple rearrangement
of Euclid’s proof but rather a strict and formalized rewriting
of the proof in the language of constructive mathematics. In
any case, this (like Hilbert’s presentation) says less about
what Euclid’s proof was (whether by contradiction, or
construction, or both) than about what Hardy wanted it to
have been, determined by his own research interests (which
were certainly not directed toward constructivism) and by
the spirit of the time.
To Hilbert, the constructive side of Euclid’s proof was
probably of philosophical rather than mathematical inter-
est, and was not of practical concern. Since Hilbert’s times,
much better proofs and methods have been devised, which
make it fairly easy to find prime numbers that have almost
any characteristic one wants them to have. Many modern
searches for higher primes use special numbers such as
Mersenne numbers, for which there exist strong criteria of
primality.36
The examples of Dirichlet, Hardy, Hilbert, and other
leading mathematicians of the 19th and 20th centuries
reading Euclid’s theorem, corroborate a recurring theme
in this article, namely that modern views of the history of
mathematics are often colored by current research
interests.
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Mathematics Pure or Applied
Martin Zerner reports that a few years ago he was scanning a list of
mathematical specialties put out by the Conseil National des Recherches
Scientifiques, and noticed that one of the categories was
Applications of Pure Mathematics.
With Zerner, we may furrow our brows. Is it an oxymoron? If not, maybe the CNRS
ought to have allowed also a category
Purification of Applied Mathematics
–which, if it means anything, surely means something rather inglorious. Like
removing from some discipline the stigma of applicability (as if there were such a
stigma). Joseph Keller’s dismissal of all such anxieties is
Pure mathematics is a subfield of applied mathematics.
Chandler Davis
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